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Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt 
136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution holds that 
no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of the law.”1  In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court cited 
Justice Brandeis’ opinion in Whitney v. California, which held that “the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of 
substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.”2  The Due Process 
Clause is not restricted to nor found in other guarantees enumerated in the 
Constitution; rather, it is a “rational continuum” which protects against 
arbitrary and unnecessary restraints or burdens placed upon the individual 
by the government.3  There has always existed a large degree of 
disagreement on the issue of abortion, and of the deeply personal issues or 
consequences connected to the decision to terminate a pregnancy; these 
debates have little bearing on the role of the Court—a role which is to 
“define the liberty of all.”4  Thus, the constitutional protection of a woman’s 
choice to terminate her pregnancy originates from the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 
In the 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a plurality of the 
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the 1973 ruling in Roe v. Wade 
of the constitutional right to have an abortion; however, the Casey Court 
adopted the “undue burden” standard, ultimately changing the standard for 
the constitutionality of abortion restrictions.6  The Court held that if the 
primary purpose of a state’s legislative or regulatory scheme “is to place a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the 
fetus attains viability,”7 an undue burden on a woman’s right to decide to 
have an abortion exists and the provision of a law is constitutionally 
invalid.8  While the state has a legitimate interest in promoting life or some 
other rational goal, a statute is nevertheless unconstitutional if the effect of 
the impugned statute or regulation creates an obstacle to a woman’s free 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 2. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1992) (citing Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 357, 373 (1927)). 
 3. Id. at 848 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)). 
 4. Id. at 850. 
 5. Id. at 846 (See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973)). 
 6. Id. at 879. 
 7. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016) (quoting Casey, 505 
U.S. at 878). 
 8. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 878). 
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choice.9  The Court in Casey held that “[u]nnecessary health regulations that 
have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman 
seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the [constitutional] right.”10 
Twenty years later, in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the 
Supreme Court was presented with the issue of whether two provisions of 
Texas House Bill 2 (hereinafter “H.B. 2”) violated a woman’s right to 
abortion.11  The Court applied the undue burden test utilized in Casey to 
H.B. 2 and determined that the two provisions in question were in violation 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the first provision 
held to be unconstitutional was the so-called admitting-privileges 
requirement, and the second provision held to be unconstitutional was in 
respect of necessary clinic upgrades to meet surgical-center requirements.12  
Thus, Whole Woman’s Health is a monumental case, as the Court 
enumerated specific state action that constitutes an undue burden on 
abortion access to women.13  Although the Court in Roe identified that “[a] 
State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion . . . is performed 
under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient,”14 the 
Court in Whole Woman’s Health explored the proper balance between a 
woman’s safety and a woman’s choice.15 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In July 2013, Texas enacted H.B. 2, which placed restrictions on 
abortion clinics operating within the state.16  The first provision amended a 
Texas law that had “previously required an abortion facility to maintain a 
written protocol for ‘managing medical emergencies and the transfer of 
patients requiring further emergency care to a hospital.’”17  The provision 
stated, “[a] physician performing or inducing an abortion . . . must, on the 
date the abortion is performed or induced, have active admitting privileges 
at a hospital that . . . is located not further than 30 miles from the location at 
which the abortion is performed or induced” (hereinafter “admitting-
privileges requirement”).18  The second provision stated, “the minimum 
standards for an abortion facility must be equivalent to the minimum 
 
 9. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
 10. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 878). 
 11. See id. at 2300. 
 12. Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 878). 
 13. See id. at 2309 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 150). 
 14. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150. 
 15. Gillian Metzger, Symposium: Hanging in the Balance, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 6, 2016, 9:23 
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/symposium-hanging-in-the-balance/. 
 16. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300. 
 17. Id. at 2300 (citing 38 TEX. REG. 6546 (2013)). 
 18. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a) (West through the end of the 2015 
Regular Session of the 84th Legislature). 
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standards adopted under [the Texas Health and Safety Code section] for 
ambulatory surgical centers” (hereinafter “surgical-center requirement”).19  
Before the law took effect, a group of Texas abortion providers sought 
facial invalidation of the admitting-privileges provision, and in October 
2013, the District Court granted an injunction, but three days later the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction 
and the provision took effect.20  A petition for certiorari to the Supreme 
Court was not filed.21 
One week after the Fifth Circuit’s decision, a group of abortion 
providers, some of whom were plaintiffs in the previous case, filed suit in 
Federal District Court.22  The plaintiffs sought injunctions preventing the 
enforcement of the admitting-privileges provision, and the surgical-center 
provisions across Texas, claiming that the provisions violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in Casey.23  The District Court held 
the two provisions created an undue burden and restricted access to women 
seeking “previability” abortions, and found such provisions would force 
many abortion clinics in the State of Texas to close.24  In June 2015, Texas 
appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found 
the admitting-privilege and surgical-center provisions of H.B. 2, with minor 
exceptions, to be constitutional, therefore reversing the District Court’s 
holding, and allowing the provisions to take effect.25 
In a 5-3 decision authored by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court of the 
United States ruled that a pre-enforcement facial challenge of the admitting-
privileges requirement did not have a res judicata effect,26 nor did the prior 
suit preclude a challenge to the surgical-center requirement.27  The Court 
held that the admitting-privileges requirement violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as no evidence of health benefits for the women was 
presented.28  Since the requirements would require the closure of nearly half 
of the clinics operating in Texas, the record before the District Court 
contained ample evidence to support the Court’s conclusion that the effects 
 
 19. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.010(a) (West through the end of the 2015 Regular 
Session of the 84th Legislature). 
 20. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300; see generally Planned Parenthood of Greater 
Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 F.3d 406, 419 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 21. Id. at 2301. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.; see Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 680-81 (W.D. Tex. 2014). 
 25. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2303 (citing Whole Women’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 
598 (5th Cir. 2015)). 
 26. Id. at 2304. 
 27. Id. at 2308. 
 28. Id. at 2313 (citing Casey, 505 U.S.at 895 (an undue burden is found when a substantial 
obstacle impedes on a large number of a woman’s choice)). 
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of H.B. 2 were an undue burden.29  Lastly, the Court found the surgical-
center requirement violated the Fourteenth Amendment because evidence 
established that it was unnecessary and would reduce the number of legally 
functioning clinics in Texas to about seven.30 
III. COURT’S DECISION AND RATIONALE 
A. Majority Opinion by Justice Breyer 
On June 27, 2016, Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in 
which Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor and Justice 
Kagan joined.31  Justice Ginsburg, who concurred only in the judgment, 
wrote separately to emphasize her view that targeted regulation of abortion 
providers does little, if anything at all, to protect the health of women.32 
In Part II of the opinion, before addressing the constitutional question, 
the Supreme Court first considered the Court of Appeals’ two procedural 
grounds for barring the petitioners’ constitutional challenges.33  Following 
an extensive discussion, the Court reversed the lower court’s decision and 
held that although some petitioners had previously brought a facial 
challenge to the admitting-privileges requirement in Abbott and were 
unsuccessful, “res judicata neither bars petitioners’ challenges to the 
admitting privileges requirement nor prevents us from awarding facial 
relief.”34 
The Court held that the proven consequences of H.B. 2 had changed 
substantially since Abbott was decided.35  The Court supported its argument 
with the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24, Comment f (1980), 
which states, where “important human values—such as the lawfulness of 
continuing personal disability or restraint—are at stake, even a slight change 
of circumstances may afford a sufficient basis for concluding that a second 
action may be brought.”36  Here, a large number of clinics had closed, 
whereas no clinics had yet done so when Abbott was argued and decided, 
and as such, a new claim existed that was not precluded.37  The Court also 
reasoned that under Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2318. 
 31. Id. at 2299. 
 32. Id. at 2321 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 
806 F.3d 908, 921 (7th Cir. 2015)). 
 33. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2304. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 2306. 
 36. Id. at 2305 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24, cmt. f (1980)). 
 37. Id. at 2306-07 (citing Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 
748 F.3d 583, 598 (5th Cir. 2014)). 
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“final judgment should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even 
if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings.”38  The Court 
found nothing wrong with the District Court awarding more relief than the 
parties requested or briefed.39 
Furthermore, the Court held that petitioners did not have to bring their 
surgical-center provision challenge in Abbott, as the lower court ruled, and 
allowed the claim to be brought forth.40  The Court reasoned that the two 
challenged provisions of H.B. 2 are individual and distinct, and that they 
serve two functions.41  The approach that the Fifth Circuit used “would 
require treating every statutory enactment as a single transaction which a 
given party would only be able to challenge one time, in one lawsuit, in 
order to avoid the effects of claim preclusion.”42  The Supreme Court ruled 
that the Court of Appeals’ procedural rulings were incorrect for the reasons 
noted.43 
In Part III of the opinion, the Court analyzed the undue burden standard 
as articulated in Roe and applied in Casey.44  The Court held that the Court 
of Appeals’ interpretation of the first part of the standard was incorrect 
where it implied that the existence or non-existence of medical benefits 
should not be considered when deciding if a regulation of abortion 
constitutes an undue burden.45  The Court instead held that burdens which 
laws impose on abortion access should be considered together with the 
benefits of those laws.46 
Next, the Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals’ test was “wrong 
to equate the judicial review applicable to the regulation of a 
constitutionally protected personal liberty with less strict review applicable 
where, for example, economic legislation is at issue.”47  In contrast, the 
Court found the Casey standard more appropriate when it “ask[ed] courts to 
consider whether any burden imposed on abortion is ‘undue.’”48 
Lastly, the Supreme Court held that legislatures must resolve questions 
of medical uncertainty and not the courts.49  The Court reasoned that 
 
 38. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2307 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 54). 
 39. Id. (citing Cole, 790 F.3d at 580). 
 40. Id. at 2308. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309. 
 44. Id. (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 150). 
 45. Id. (emphasis added). 
 46. Id.; see Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-98. 
 47. Id. at 2309-10; see, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955). 
 48. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310. 
 49. Id. 
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considerable weight of evidence and judicial proceedings should be used 
when determining the constitutionality of laws regulating abortions.50 
In Part IV of the opinion, the Court supported the District Court’s 
holding that H.B. 2’s admitting-privileges requirement imposed an undue 
burden on a woman’s right to have an abortion.51  The Court found that 
although the purpose of the admitting-privileges requirement was to help 
ensure women had quick and efficient access to hospitals should any 
problems arise during the abortion procedure, there was no significant 
health-related problems that the new law purported to remedy.52  When 
questioned directly, Texas was unable to identify a single instance when the 
new requirement would have provided women with better treatment during 
the abortion process.53 
Moreover, the Court found that a significant number of abortion clinics 
were closing due to this requirement as “hospitals often condition admitting 
privileges on reaching a certain number of admissions per year,” and that 
due to the relative safety of the procedure, doctors who worked at clinics 
and performed abortions were not admitting enough patients to nearby 
hospitals to maintain their admitting privileges.54  Further—the clinic 
closures resulted in: fewer doctors available, longer wait times, and, most 
notably, the driving distances for women more than 150 miles from a 
provider increased from 86,000 to 400,000.55  These burdens, taken together 
with the virtual absence of any health benefit, led the Court to the “undue 
burden” conclusion that H.B. 2 is no more effective than the preexisting 
Texas law.56 
Lastly, the Court addressed and dismissed the dissent’s argument that 
clinics may have closed for reasons unrelated to the provisions of H.B. 2.57  
The Court found that the petitioners “satisfied their burden to present 
evidence of causation by presenting direct testimony as well as plausible 
inferences to be drawn from the timing of the clinic closures.”58  In 
concluding this point, the Court found that the dissent incorrectly speculated 
that H.B. 2 may have targeted unsafe clinics, that an extra layer of 
regulation would not have deterred the type of “determined wrongdoers” 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 2310-11. 
 52. Id. at 2311; Brief for Respondents at 32-37, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 
2292 (2016) (No. 15-274). 
 53. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2312 (quoting Brief for Society of Hospital Medicine et 
al. as Amici Curiae at 11, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274)). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 2313 (citing Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 681). 
 56. Id. at 2314; see Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-87). 
 57. Id. at 2313. 
 58. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2313. 
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contemplated by the dissent, and that the actions contemplated by the 
dissent were already covered by existing Texas law.59 
In Part V of the opinion, the Court supported the District Court’s 
holding that the second challenged provision, H.B. 2’s surgical-center 
requirement, provided no further health benefits for women and it posed a 
substantial obstacle to women seeking an abortion, and therefore is 
considered to be an undue burden.60  The Court found that making clinics 
comply with the surgical-center standards provided no benefits to patients 
as almost all complications arise after the patient has left the clinic, and that 
the upgrades required would leave only seven or eight clinics operating in 
the State of Texas.61  Decreasing the amount of clinics would mean that 
clinics which were providing 14,000 abortions annually would now take on 
upwards of 70,000 abortions annually.62  The Court noted that “common 
sense suggests that, more often than not, a physical facility that satisfies a 
certain physical demand will not be able to meet five times that demand 
without expanding or otherwise incurring significant costs.”63 
The dissent argued that many facilities operate under full capacity and 
clinics would be able to handle the increase in patients or could increase the 
capacity.64  In regard to this argument, the Court responded that not only are 
medical facilities already known for their lengthy wait-times, while 
operating under capacity, but the amount of closed facilities due to the 
admitting-privileges requirement would mean a decrease in the number of 
available physicians that facilities could hire.65 
What the Court found fundamental was that Texas sought to make 
women travel long distances to facilities that will likely lack personal 
attention, emotional support, and security in the ability to have serious 
conversations with doctors.66  The Court attributed the potential decline in 
quality of care to the fully taxed facilities operating beyond capacity 
because of the closure of facilities due to the surgical-center requirements, 
which poses a substantial obstacle to women seeking abortions and 
constitutes an undue burden.67 
In Part VI of the opinion, the Court “consider[ed] three additional 
arguments Texas ma[de] and deem[ed] none persuasive.”68  First, Texas 
 
 59. Id. at 2314. 
 60. Id. at 2315; see Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 684. 
 61. Id. at 2316; see Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 682. 
 62. Id. at 2316 (citing Cole, 790 F.3d at 589-90). 
 63. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2317. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 2318; see Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 682. 
 67. Id. at 2318; see Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 682. 
 68. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2318. 
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argued that H.B. 2’s severability clause precluded invalidation of the two 
challenged provisions as Texas argued that if a court finds any portion to be 
invalid, that portion can be severed and the rest of the Act will not be 
affected.69  The Court found that even though an attempt of a severability 
clause existed, it does not mean the Court must apply partial measures when 
it has been found that the provisions were facially unconstitutional.70 
Second, Texas does not view the two provisions as substantial 
obstacles, which are compulsory requirements that must be met in order to 
satisfy the undue burden standard.71  Texas explains that H.B. 2 provisions 
only apply to certain women of reproductive age, which would not be a 
“large fraction” as required by Casey.72  The Court reasoned that in this 
case, as in Casey, “the relevant denominator is ‘those [women] for whom 
[the provision] is an actual rather than an irrelevant restriction.”73 
Lastly, Texas cites Simonpoulous v. Virginia,74 where the Court upheld 
a surgical-center requirement applicable to second-trimester abortions.75  
Unlike Simonpoulous, the provisions before the Court in the instant case 
apply to all abortions and, moreover, Casey clarified ‘viability’ as the 
relevant point on limiting a woman’s access to abortion, rather than the 
trimester framework.76 
B. Concurring Opinion by Justice Ginsburg 
In a short concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg expressed how safe and 
low the complication rates of abortions are and to find that the argument or 
justification that H.B. 2 could protect women is beyond belief.77  
Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg argued that many procedures unrelated to 
abortions are performed in the United States that are far more dangerous, 
including childbirth itself, yet are not subjected to neither admitting-
privilege requirements nor surgical-center requirements.78  In closing, 
Justice Ginsburg stated that H.B. 2’s provisions are unnecessary, as they do 
nothing for a woman’s health and unfairly subject women to difficult 
pathways to obtaining abortions.79 
 
 69. Id. at 2318; see Brief for Respondents at 50-52, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 
S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274). 
 70. Id. at 2319. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 2319 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 894-95). 
 73. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2319 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 894-95). 
 74. 462 U.S. 506 (1983). 
 75. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2320. 
 76. Id.; see generally Simonpoulous, 462 U.S. at 506). 
 77. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2320-21 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Schimel, 806 
F.3d at 912). 
 78. Id. at 2320 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see Schimel, 806 F.3d at 921-22. 
 79. Id. at 2321; see Schimel, 806 F.3d at 921. 
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C. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Thomas 
Justice Thomas dissented, arguing that the majority decision not only 
exemplifies the Court’s tendency to bend the rules when abortion is the 
issue,80 but also “creates an abortion exception to ordinary rules of res 
judicata, ignores compelling evidence that Texas’ law imposes no 
unconstitutional burden and disregards basic principles of the severability 
doctrine.”81  Initially, in Part I, Justice Thomas criticized the case as one 
which should never have been brought in front of the Supreme Court, given 
that for most of the Nation’s history, cases could not be brought by third 
parties in order to vindicate the rights of another.82  Justice Thomas sternly 
noted that the Court has been especially willing to relax the rules 
specifically for due process rights as they related to abortion: 
[t]here is no surer sign that our jurisprudence has gone off the rails 
than this: After creating a constitutional right to abortion because ‘it 
involve[s] the most intimate and personal choices a person may 
make . . . ,’83 the Court has created special rules that cede its 
enforcement to others.84 
In Part II, Justice Thomas stated that the Court misinterpreted the undue 
burden standard in Casey in three ways.85  First, Justice Thomas argued that 
Casey did not intend to balance the benefits and burdens of provisions; 
rather, the Court in Casey evaluated the provisions posed for undue burden 
without weighing the benefits.86  Second, by discarding the opinion that 
“legislatures, and not courts, must resolve questions of medical 
uncertainty,” the majority abandoned the traditional rule in Casey of 
respecting deference to legislatures’ decisions related to areas of medical 
uncertainty.87  Lastly, he argued that the majority overruled an outcome of 
Casey “by requiring laws to have more than a rational basis [to act] even if 
they do not substantially impede access to abortion.”88  Therefore, although 
the amount is unknown, the level of state’s interest must now be greater 
 
 80. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2321 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Stenberg v. 
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 954 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 81. Id. at 2321. 
 82. Id. at 2321-22. 
 83. Id. at 2323 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851) (majority opinion). 
 84. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2323 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 85. Id. at 2323-24. 
 86. Id. at 2324 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-87). 
 87. Id. at 2325. 
 88. Id. 
9
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than a basic “rational basis,” which has inflamed to a level never used 
before.89 
Further, in Part III, Justice Thomas rejected the majority’s undue burden 
test as it is “a made-up test”90 and resembles the strict-scrutiny standard that 
Casey explicitly rejected, under which only the utmost convincing 
rationales justified restrictions or provisions on abortion.91  Justice Thomas 
believes the Court should only adopt policy preferences which balance 
constitutional rights and interests92 and abandon any other tinkering with the 
levels of scrutiny to achieve its desired result.93 
Lastly, in Part IV, Justice Thomas respectfully dissented, identifying 
that the Court has “simultaneously transformed judicially created rights like 
the right to abortion into preferred constitutional rights, while disfavoring 
many of the rights actually enumerated in the Constitution.”94  Justice 
Thomas reasoned that the Court is not to favor some rights over others, 
which has occurred with abortion,95 and argued that, instead the Court is to 
abide by one set of rules, namely the Constitution, rather than creating 
policy-driven value judgments.96 
D. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Alito 
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, 
dissented.97  Justice Alito criticized the majority for abandoning their 
neutral views and well-established law when abortion is brought before the 
Court.98  In Part I, he argued that the Court has created an unprecedented 
exception to res judicata, where one may relitigate their invalid 
constitutional claim if new and better supporting evidence99 is later 
produced, which, he argued, is entirely contrary to the Nation’s case law,100 
the first Restatement of Judgments and the rules of the Restatement 
(Second) of Judgment.101  Justice Alito saw no possible reasoning for the 
relitigation of the admitting privileges provision, unless at the time of prior 
 
 89. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2325 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 90. Id. at 2327 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 570 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)). 
 91. Id. at 2326; see Casey, 505 U.S. at 871, 874-75 (plurality opinion). 
 92. Id. at 2328. 
 93. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2327 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 94. Id. at 2329. 
 95. See id. 
 96. Id. at 2329-30. 
 97. Id. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 98. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 99. Id. at 2337. 
 100. Id. at 2335 (citations omitted). 
 101. Id. at 2339-40. 
10
Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 43 [], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol43/iss1/8
2017] WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH V. HELLERSTEDT 267 
litigation it was unable to be shown what effects the law would have,102 
which was not the case since the plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate their claim.103 
In Part II, Justice Alito addressed the application of claim preclusion to 
H.B. 2, chiefly the surgical-center provision.104  Justice Alito stated the 
Court incorrectly addressed the H.B. 2 provisions as separate and distinct 
(and therefore splitting the claims), while the petitioners, and Justice Alito 
himself, view the transaction as a single unit that should not be split 
following appropriately, § 24 of the Second Restatement.105  Justice Alito 
reasoned that the two provisions are closely enough related as they both 
execute regulations on abortion clinics, justified for the protection of 
women’s health whom are seeking abortions, both impose the same burden, 
and both are attacked by the petitioners as a single package.106  The two 
provisions “form a convenient trial unit,”107 should not have been split, and 
therefore the surgical-center provision, like the admitting-privileges 
provision, should have been precluded.108 
In Part III, Justice Alito argued that even if the claims were not 
precluded, the petitioners did not meet their burden to prove that the 
provisions had an unconstitutional impact, that is, an undue burden, on a 
large fraction of Texas women.109  Justice Alito stated that the petitioners 
relied on two loose inferences that the undue burden was placed on a large 
fraction of Texas women.110  The first inference, with notably no evidence 
to support it,111 was that the petitioners attributed the number of abortion 
clinics that closed after the enactment of H.B. 2 to the implementation of the 
two provisions.112  Justice Alito acknowledged that H.B. 2 intended to close 
unsafe clinics, but he presented four alternative reasons as to why clinics 
have closed.113  The second inference Justice Alito found was that the 
number of abortions performed each year at closed clinics was well below 
the total number of abortions, and, therefore, the clinics could not meet the 
demands of women in the state, failing, however, to provide any evidence of 
actual capacity of clinics.114  The petitioners put on evidence in the earlier 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 104. Id. at 2340. 
 105. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1980)). 
 106. Id. at 2341. 
 107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1980). 
 108. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2342 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. at 2343. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. at 2344. 
 112. Id. at 2343. 
 113. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2344 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 114. Id. at 2348-49. 
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case that suggested the provision had no effect on capacity, and Justice 
Alito found no reason as to why they were unable to, or chose not to here.115 
In Part IV, Justice Alito went so far as to state that even if res judicata 
did not apply or H.B. 2 did impose an undue burden, the Court was still 
incorrect to rule that the admitting-privileges provision and surgical-center 
provision must be enjoined in their entirety because of the severability 
clause.116  Justice Alito reasoned that the admitting privileges clause is easy 
to apply; the “requirement must be upheld in every city in which its 
application does not pose an undue burden.”117 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Introduction 
In Casey, the Supreme Court delivered a standard to govern the validity 
of laws that placed restrictions on abortions.118  The standard examined 
whether a state abortion regulation has the “purpose or effect” of imposing 
an undue burden so that the provision “is to place a substantial obstacle in 
the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains 
viability.”119  Following Casey, “the Court has repeatedly embraced Casey’s 
understanding of substantive due-process analysis as requiring courts to 
chart an evolving balance between individuals and the state.”120  Notably, in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court answered Casey’s plea for reasoned 
judgments and did away with efforts to limit due-process liberty by 
reducing it to historical manifestations.121 
In Whole Woman’s Health, the majority opinion upheld the role courts 
play in ensuring that states respect the constitutional principles of liberty, 
equality, and dignity.122  This analysis focuses on these holdings, namely: 
(1) third-party standing issues (2) evaluating the role of claim preclusion in 
constitutional challenges;123 and (3) examination and future application of 
the undue burden standard.124 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 2350. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2342-43 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007)). 
 119. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 878). 
 120. Metzger, supra note 15. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See generally Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2292. 
 123. See id. at 2304-09. 
 124. See id. at 2309-18. 
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B. Discussion 
1. Third-Party Standing 
Up until the twentieth century, individuals could not challenge a statute 
to vindicate the rights of others.125  In the twentieth century, the Court began 
recognizing exceptions, while attaching limits for individuals who sued 
asserting third parties’ rights.126  Justice Thomas stated that the Court grants 
exceptions “only if the plaintiff ha[s] a ‘close relation to the third party’ and 
the third party face[s] a formidable ‘hindrance’ to asserting his own 
rights.”127 
Justice Thomas stated that the only reason this case was before the 
Court was because “the Court has shown a particular willingness to 
undercut restrictions on third-party standing when the right to abortion is at 
stake.”128  Specifically, Justice Thomas believes the Court has erroneously 
been more forgiving when the cases involve abortion clinics and physicians 
asserting the substantive due process right of a woman to have an 
abortion.129  Justice Thomas found the majority inconsistent when the Court 
stated that the right to abortion is one of the most personal and intimate 
decisions central to personal autonomy, yet has created rules that allow for 
others to enforce this claim for an individual.130 
The general bar on third-party standing is simply a principle, subject to 
exceptions, and that bar is removed when it is believed that right-holders are 
unlikely to come forward to defend their own rights.131  Given the private 
nature of an abortion decision, and the potential publicity of a lawsuit, the 
incentive for women to come forward is rather unpleasant.132  Despite 
strong arguments for upholding standing law, the Singleton plurality found, 
as did the majorities in Eisenstadt, Griswold, Craig, and Powers, that a 
general principle is subject to exceptions and physicians and clinics 
bringing suit on behalf of women, is appropriate third-party standing.133  
Since the decision in Singleton, doctors’ and clinics’ assertions of 
constitutional rights of both patients and hypothetical patients have been 
 
 125. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2322 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 126. See id. at 2322. 
 127. See id. (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991)). 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. Michael Dorf, The Procedural Issues in the Texas Abortion Case, VERDICT-JUSTIA (June 29, 
2016), https://verdict.justia.com/2016/06/29/procedural-issues-texas-abortion-case. 
 131. See Dorf, supra note 130. 
 132. Stephen J. Wallace, Note: Why Third-Party Standing in Abortion Suits Deserves a Closer 
Look, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1369, 1396 (2009). 
 133. Wallace, supra note 132, at 1397. 
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accepted by the Court even when women have continued and successfully 
asserted their own rights before the Court.134 
Although Justice Thomas appears to have a convincing argument that 
the Court seems to be more forgiving with third-party standing claims 
involving abortions, “[t]he Court has held that a party to a civil case has 
third-party standing to litigate the rights of prospective jurors and that a bar 
owner has third-party standing to litigate the rights of her customers.”135  It 
appears as though the Court has firmly established that abortion claims can 
be brought by clinics or physicians on behalf of women.136  Therefore, 
Justice Thomas’ claim that the Court has been more forgiving when it 
comes to this matter is not supported by countless third-party standing 
issues successfully argued before the Court.137 
2. Evaluating the Role of Claim Preclusion 
Undoubtedly, the majority and Justice Alito’s dissent disagree on the 
fundamental execution of claim preclusion as applied to both the admitting 
privileges requirement and the surgical-center requirement of H.B. 2.138  
The majority opinion, written by Justice Breyer, struck down both 
provisions, finding them in violation of a woman’s constitutional right to 
abortion.139  A separate dissent, written by Justice Alito, argued that the 
Court should never have had the opportunity to address the substantive 
issues, as the operative facts presented in this case had been previously 
litigated.140  Following Justice Alito’s reasoning, the doctrine of claim 
preclusion should have applied.141 
This Court found that after provisions of a new law have been applied, 
the circumstances had changed enough so that a previously litigated and 
unsuccessful facial challenge on the same provisions may be brought before 
the court again.142  The majority held that the unsuccessful facial challenge 
in Abbott occurred prior to the enforcement of the provisions and prior to 
many of the abortion clinics closing.143  The majority reasoned that, here, 
the petitioners brought forth a challenge after the provisions had been 
enforced and after many clinics have been closed, evidencing a dissimilarity 
 
 134. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2322 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 135. Dorf, supra note 130. 
 136. Wallace, supra note 132. 
 137. See Dorf, supra note 130. 
 138. Id. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 139. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Casey, 505 U.S. 
at 878). 
 140. Id. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 141. See id. at 2340. 
 142. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2305. 
 143. Id. at 2306. 
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that evidently excludes itself from the doctrine of claim preclusion.144  The 
majority mischaracterizes the judgment in Abbott as an unsuccessful 
premature facial challenge, when instead the Court of Appeals held that the 
evidence in Abbott was insufficient,145 and petitioners had the opportunity to 
seek review, yet chose not to.146 
The majority made an appealing argument that the claim in Abbott was 
too speculative and that requiring litigants to challenge every single 
provision would be unreasonable.147  However, this statement misses the 
importance of the role that fundamental claim preclusion plays in the 
American legal system;148 unsuccessful previously litigated claims, 
extinguish claims that could have been brought in the first case.149  Again, it 
appears as if the Court is playing with the rules of civil procedure because 
of the substantive abortion claim.150  Justice Thomas undoubtedly agrees 
with Justice Alito’s argument that when abortion issues come before the 
Court, they “ream with procedural exceptions, as though the usual canons of 
construction were reversed.”151 
The Court found that claim preclusion did not bar challenges to the 
admitting-privileges requirement.152  The Court reasoned that new material 
facts were brought forth—facts relating to important human values that 
have the ability to produce a new claim.153  The majority failed to recognize 
that the first suit and the present claim “involve the very same ‘operative 
facts,’ namely, the enactment of the admitting privileges requirement, which 
according to the theory underlying petitioners’ facial claims, would have the 
exact same effect of causing abortion clinics to close.”154  Justice Alito’s 
dissent correctly describes the majority’s new material evidence as merely 
being brought before the Court as they now have “better evidence than they 
did at the time of the first case with respect to the number of clinics that 
would have to close as a result of the admitting privileges requirement.”155  
With an adequate amount of supporting evidence, the majority’s holding is 
in violation of the underlying rationale of claim preclusion; parties may not 
 
 144. Id. at 2304-05. 
 145. Id. at 2335; see Abbott, 748 F.3d at 598-99. 
 146. Id. at 2335. 
 147. Dorf, supra note 130. 
 148. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2331 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 149. Id. at 2340. 
 150. Erika Bachiochi, Symposium: Is Hellerstedt This Generation’s Roe?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 
28, 2016, 11:46 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-is-hellerstedt-this-generations-
roe/. 
 151. Bachiochi, supra note 150. 
 152. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2304. 
 153. See id. at 2305; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24, cmt. f (1980). 
 154. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2333 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 155. See id. at 2335. 
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relitigate their case because they have gathered better evidence, or more 
bluntly, claim preclusion does not contain a “better evidence” exception.156  
The majority sought support of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 
24, comment f, finding that new material facts can bring a previously 
litigated case before the court as a new claim, and it relied on previous 
Court holdings for support.157  Analyzing the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 24, comment f, it is evident that new material should be 
brought forth only in limited circumstances, and the Restatement gives three 
hypothetical cases of limited circumstances—none of which appear to 
portray the presented situation in the case before the Court.158  Further, upon 
examination of the majority’s case support for Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 24, comment f, it has little, if any, weight to the question at 
issue; the cases presented fail to address claim preclusion, and if the cases 
do slightly reference claim preclusion,159 they “endorse the unremarkable 
proposition that a prior judgment does not preclude new claims based on 
acts occurring after the time of the first judgment.”160  Most notably, 
“[w]hen the highest court in the land relies upon a comment from the 
Second Restatement of Judgments, rather than its own precedent, you know 
the Justices are blazing a trail laid especially for abortion.”161  This is an 
issue that has presented itself time and time again “which must be chalked 
up to the Court’s inclination to bend the rules when any effort to limit 
abortion, or even speak in opposition to abortion, is at issue.”162 
Moreover, the majority held that the doctrine of claim preclusion does 
not prevent the parties from challenging the surgical-center requirement of 
H.B. 2 in this Court.163  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
recognized that the petitioners did not bring their claim in Abbott, but 
should have done so, because the surgical-center requirement and the 
admitting-privileges requirement arose from the same transaction, involved 
the same parties and facilities, were enacted at the same time, and there was 
 
 156. See id.; see, e.g., Torres v. Shalala, 48 F.3d 887, 894 (5th Cir. 1995) (“If simply submitting 
new evidence rendered a prior decision factually distinct, res judicata would cease to exist”); Geiger v. 
Foley Hoag LLP Retirement Plan, 521 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 2008) (claim preclusion “applies even if the 
litigant is prepared to present different evidence . . . in the second action”); International Union of 
Operating Engineers-Employers Constr. Industry Pension, Welfare and Training Trust Funds v. Karr, 
994 F.2d 1426, 1430 (9th Cir. 1993) (new evidence may be presented, but that does not defeat the 
doctrine of res judicata). 
 157. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2305. 
 158. See id. at 2336-37 (emphasis added). 
 159. Id. at 2335 (Alito, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 772 
(1931); Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 328 (1955); Third Nat. Bank of 
Louisville v. Stone, 174 U.S. 432, 434 (1899). 
 160. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2335. 
 161. Bachiochi, supra note 150. 
 162. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 954. 
 163. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309. 
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a common nucleus of operative fact.164  Justice Breyer, writing for the 
majority, reasoned that “[t]he Court of Appeals failed, however, to take 
account of meaningful differences . . . [t]he surgical-center provision and 
the admitting-privileges provision are separate, distinct provisions . . . 
set[ting] forth two different, independent requirements with different 
enforcement dates.”165  Justice Breyer stated that the Court has never 
mandated that relating separate claims must be brought before the Court in a 
single suit, and if this were the case, it would encourage a “kitchen sink 
approach” which would only have detrimental effects on court 
proceedings.166 
In regard to “splitting” claims167 as the majority has demonstrably done 
here, the Second Restatement bars from litigation “any part of the 
transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action 
arose.”168  It is evident that the two claims are closely related, as they are 
both provisions in H.B. 2 that the petitioners attack as a single package, 
arguing that the provisions enact new requirements onto abortion clinics, for 
the combined effect of closing down clinics.169  Therefore, unsuccessful 
previously litigated claims extinguish claims that could have been brought 
in the first case, and the doctrine of claim preclusion should apply.170 
The doctrine of claim preclusion is a foundational element in the 
American legal system.171  As stated in Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling 
Men’s Asso.,172 “[p]ublic policy dictates that there be an end of litigation[,] 
that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the 
contest, and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as 
between the parties.”173  The majority lacks precedent and patently 
disregards the well-founded doctrine of claim preclusion.174  Ironically, if 
the case had been decided on procedural grounds, punting the substantive 
issue into the near future, a Court with a new appointment may have used 
the opportunity to overturn the Casey/Gonzales v. Carhart compromise in 
favor of something more like Roe.175  Lastly, in regard to constitutional 
 
 164. See id. at 2307 (citing Cole, 790 F.3d at 581). 
 165. See id. at 2308. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2340 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1980)). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 2341; Brief for Petitioners at 40-44, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 
2292 (2016) (No. 15-274). 
 170. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2340. 
 171. Id. at 2331. 
 172. 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931). 
 173. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2331 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 174. Id. at 2332. 
 175. Bachiochi, supra note 150. 
17
Claxton: WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH V. HELLERSTEDT
Published by DigitalCommons@ONU,
274 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
issues, the Court’s “refusal to apply well-established law in a neutral way is 
indefensible and will undermine public confidence in the Court as a fair and 
neutral arbiter.”176 
3. Future Application of the Undue Burden Standard 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has demonstrably rubber 
stamped state laws that would close abortion clinics across the state of 
Texas—an evident and inadequate execution of protecting woman’s rights 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.177  By finding H.B. 2 in violation of 
the Constitution, the Supreme Court furthered the notion that the 
“Constitution protects a woman’s right to choose abortion and . . . courts 
have an obligation to carefully review state regulation of abortion to ensure 
that it respects the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of liberty for all.”178  
Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, held that the undue burden 
standard, “requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on 
abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer,”179 therefore, 
more than just rubber stamping state laws is needed to protect the rights of 
women.180 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held a state law 
“constitutional if (1) it does not have the purpose or effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a 
nonviable fetus; and (2) it is reasonably related to (or designed to further) a 
legitimate state interest.”181  The Court of Appeals is incorrect in this 
articulation, as the test may be read to imply that medical benefits should 
not be taken into consideration when considering whether an abortion 
regulation constitutes an undue burden; the Court of Appeals’ decision 
plainly deviates from the rule announced in Casey.182 
The undue burden test that Justice Breyer prescribed in the case at bar is 
not that of the Court rubber stamping legislators’ decisions; it requires the 
Court to take a more meaningful approach.183  With the undue benefit test, 
courts now will consider limitations of access, but also the benefits that the 
 
 176. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2331. 
 177. See David Gans, Symposium: No More Rubber-Stamping State Regulation of Abortion, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2016, 5:15 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-no-more-
rubber-stamping-state-regulation-of-abortion/. 
 178. Gans, supra note 177. 
 179. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310; see Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-98 (balancing the 
spousal notification provision). 
 180. See Gans, supra note 177. 
 181. Id. at 2309 (citing Cole, 790 F.3d at 572). 
 182. See id. at 2309. 
 183. See Mary Ziegler, Symposium: The Court Once Again Makes the “Undue-Burden” Test a 
Referendum on the Facts, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2016, 2:34 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/ 
06/symposium-the-court-once-again-makes-the-undue-burden-test-a-referendum-on-the-facts/. 
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regulations will impose.184  A meaningful approach will not abandon 
legislative findings (Justice Breyer indicated that the relevant statute in the 
case at bar did not set forth any legislative findings),185 but rather, the 
legislature now works together with the courts, who will retain the power to 
balance the benefits and burdens.186  Exemplifying this point, “[the district 
court] did not simply substitute its own judgment for that of the legislature . 
. . [rather] [t]he district court considered the evidence in the record—
including expert evidence, presented in stipulations, depositions, and 
testimony . . . then weighed the asserted benefits against the burdens.”187  In 
comparison, Justice Thomas, writing in his dissent, argued that this was “a 
way that will surely mystify lower courts for years to come.”188  Rather, the 
undue burden standard will maintain the integrity of our courts, ensuring 
that both sides bring compelling, well-researched arguments before the 
courts, and therefore it will no longer lay in the hands of the legislature to 
ensure women’s rights are best protected.189 
It is evident that laws like H.B. 2 “are not the product of some new 
enthusiasm for promoting women’s health but of a resourceful anti-abortion 
movement.”190  Many other medical procedures are far more dangerous, but 
do not have restrictions imposed on them, such as the ones H.B. 2 imposes 
on the women of Texas;191 abortion notably being “one of the safest medical 
procedures performed in the United States.”192  The Court found that 
nothing in Texas’ record evidences their argument that “the new law 
advanced Texas’ legitimate interest in protecting women’s health,”193 rather, 
they impose substantial obstacles in the way of woman seeking an abortion, 
which in turn imposes an undue burden on this constitutionally protected 
right.194  The reanimation of the undue burden standard issued by the Court 
signals “trouble ahead for that approach [the undue burden], not only in 
 
 184. See Ziegler, supra note 183. 
 185. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309-10. 
 186. See Ziegler, supra note 183. 
 187. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310. 
 188. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2326 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 189. See Ziegler, supra note 183. 
 190. Margaret Talbot, The Supreme Court’s Just Application of the Undue-Burden Standard for 
Abortion, NEW YORKER (June 27, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-supreme-
courts-just-application-of-the-undue-burden-standard-for-abortion. 
 191. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2320 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); see Schimel 806 F.3d 
at 921-22; see also Brief for Social Science Researchers as Amici Curiae at 9-11, Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274) (comparing abortion statistics with other 
surgeries). 
 192. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2320 (quoting Brief for Social Science Researchers as 
Amici Curiae at 5-9, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15-274)). 
 193. Id. at 2311. 
 194. Id. at 2312. 
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Texas but in other states—including Oklahoma, Louisiana, and 
Wisconsin—where similar laws are currently blocked by lower courts.”195 
V. CONCLUSION 
Twenty years after the landmark case, Casey, was decided, Whole 
Woman’s Health presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to 
enumerate specific state action, which constitutes an undue burden on 
abortion access to women.196  The Court, finding H.B. 2 unconstitutional, 
correctly held that if the primary purpose of a state’s legislative or 
regulatory scheme “is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability,”197 an undue burden 
exists and the provision of a law is constitutionally invalid.198  Here, the 
undue burden standard will maintain the integrity of our courts, ensuring 
that both sides bring compelling, well-researched arguments before the 
courts, and therefore it will no longer lay in the hands of the legislature to 
ensure women’s rights are best protected.199 
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 195. Talbot, supra note 190. 
 196. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300. 
 197. Id. at 2300 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878). 
 198. Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 878). 
 199. See Ziegler, supra note 183. 
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